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The term “charitable contribution” as used in section 170
has been generally held synonymous with the term “gift”.
Considine v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 955, 967 (1980). A gift is
generally defined as a voluntary transfer of property by the
owner to another without consideration therefor. If a payment
proceeds primarily from the incentive of anticipated benefit to
the payor beyond the satisfaction that flows from the performance
of a generous act, it is not a gift. If the transfer is impelled
primarily by the anticipation of some economic benefit or is in
fact an exchange in the form of a substantial quid pro quo, it is
not a contribution. Id.
In determining whether a statutory contribution or gift was
made, the primary factor is the transferor’s dominant motive or
intention in making the transfer. Commissioner v. Duberstein,
363 U.S. 278, 286 (1960). Identification of the dominant motive
for the transfer must be made on the basis of all of the facts.
United States v. Am. Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105, 116-118 (1986);
Commissioner v. Duberstein, supra at 289.
We are persuaded that the payments to the charitable
organization were not charitable contributions under section 170,
because petitioners’ business expected to receive certain
services in return. The understanding between Mr. Dunnegan and
Big Brothers/Big Sisters was that Big Brothers/Big Sisters would
provide promotional services and labor to J&G Enterprise, and
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