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importantly, if the payment proceeds primarily from "the
constraining force of any moral or legal duty," or from "the
incentive of anticipated benefit" of an economic nature, * *
* it is not a gift. And, conversely, "Where the payment is
in return for services rendered, [it] is irrelevant that the
donor derives no economic benefit from it." * * * A gift in
the statutory sense, on the other hand, proceeds from a
"detached and disinterested generosity," * * * "out of
affection, respect, admiration, charity or like impulses." *
* * And, in this regard, the most critical consideration, as
the Court was agreed in the leading cases here, is the
transferor's "intention." * * * "What controls is the
intention with which payment, however voluntary, has been
made." * * *
The record does not support a finding that the $25,000
payment to petitioner, a former employee of the Company, was
intended to be a gift. To be sure, while petitioner's former
employer was grateful to current and retired employees, including
petitioner, for their services to the Company over the years, the
record reflects that the payment in question was not imbued with
any characteristics that would make it a gift under the
principles recited above. To the contrary, the Company
considered the payment as compensation for services rendered, and
this is reflected by the Company's issuance of an IRS Form 1099-R
and the withholding of Federal and State income taxes on the
payment. Moreover, the Company was careful to point out that the
payment was not to be considered a payment for services rendered
during the year of the payment, 1996 (to avoid reduction of
Social Security benefits by retired recipients). However,
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