Joseph M. Grey Public Accountant, P.C. - Page 12




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          exercise control over Mr. Grey in the performance of his                    
          services.  In that regard, we note that Mr. Grey chose to do                
          business in corporate form through petitioner.  His assertion               
          before this Court (on behalf of petitioner) that petitioner                 
          logically cannot exercise control over him in the performance of            
          his services (presumably owing to his dual role as service                  
          provider to, and sole shareholder of, petitioner) amounts to a              
          request that we disregard the corporate form in deciding the                
          issue before us.  That we shall not do.  See Moline Props. Inc.             
          v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436 (1943).5                                      

               4(...continued)                                                        
          Moreover, the FUTA definition of “employee” in effect for such              
          years, while stating the general rule that such term includes               
          corporate officers, appears to have contemplated that a corporate           
          officer could be an independent contractor under the common law,            
          in which case the officer would not be treated as an employee for           
          FUTA purposes.  See, e.g., sec. 1607(i), I.R.C. 1939.  In light             
          of the regulatory and statutory developments that occurred after            
          the years at issue in Tex. Carbonate Co. v. Phinney, 307 F.2d at            
          291-292, the Court of Appeals’ conclusion therein that “the usual           
          employer-employee tests are to be applied” in determining the               
          status of a corporate officer for employment tax purposes may no            
          longer be relevant.  See C.D. Ulrich, Ltd. v. United States, 692            
          F. Supp. 1053, 1055 (D. Minn. 1988) (“Under both the weight of              
          the case law and under the treasury regulations, a corporate                
          officer is to be treated as an employee if he renders more than             
          minor services.”).                                                          
               5  Petitioner also cites Automated Typesetting, Inc. v.                
          United States, 527 F. Supp. 515 (E.D. Wis. 1981) in support of              
          its position that common law factors should control in                      
          determining whether a corporate officer is an employee for                  
          employment tax purposes.  The court in Automated Typesetting,               
          Inc., however, did not eschew the statutory mandate regarding               
          classification of corporate officers; rather, it simply found               
          that the individuals in question were employees under a common              
                                                             (continued...)           





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