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trial.4 Furthermore, the record before us contains insufficient
facts to support a finding that petitioner was entitled to relief
under either alternative provision.5
Petitioner argues that he is entitled to a refund because
the payment of the deficiency was “involuntary” in that the
liability was satisfied by respondent’s crediting of later years’
overpayments to the 1993 deficiency, without notification to or
permission by petitioner. Respondent, however, has discretion to
credit overpayments to any outstanding tax liabilities, and the
crediting of such an overpayment is treated as if the taxpayer
had received a refund and in turn paid the tax liability. Secs.
6402(a), 7422(d); Culpepper-Smith v. United States, supra. The
1993 tax liability has been satisfied, and section 6015(g)(3)
clearly prohibits a refund resulting from relief afforded by
section 6015(c).
Reviewed and adopted as the report of the Small Tax Case
Division.
4Petitioner states in his petition that “Taking into account
all the facts and circumstances, it is inequitable to hold the
Petitioner liable.” Language similar to this is found in both
sec. 6015(b) and (f). However, petitioner did not specifically
refer to either of these provisions, and at trial the focus of
petitioner’s argument was on the fact that payment of the 1993
tax deficiency was “involuntary”, as discussed infra.
5Petitioner would not be entitled to relief under sec.
6015(f) unless it were shown that, contrary to respondent’s
determination, petitioner is not entitled to relief under sec.
6015(c). Sec. 6015(f)(2).
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