Steven K. Stoddard and Ellen M. Stoddard - Page 27




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               In determining whether a dwelling unit is a residence within           
          the meaning of section 280A(a), section 280A(d)(1) provides in              
          pertinent part:                                                             
               a taxpayer uses a dwelling unit during the taxable year                
               as a residence if he uses such unit (or portion                        
               thereof) for personal purposes for a number of days                    
               which exceeds the greater of--                                         
                    (A) 14 days, or                                                   
                    (B) 10 percent of the number of days during such                  
               year for which such unit is rented at a fair rental.                   
               We have found that petitioners did not rent the Doon Way               
          residence during 1997.  The Doon Way residence constituted a                
          “residence” within the meaning of section 280A(d)(1) only if                
          petitioners’ use of the Doon Way residence for personal purposes            
          exceeded 14 days during 1997.  See sec. 280A(d)(1).                         
               At trial, Ms. Stoddard testified that the Doon Way residence           
          was petitioners’ primary residence during 1997.15  On the instant           
          record, we find that petitioners have failed to carry their                 
          burden of proving that their personal use of the Doon Way resi-             
          dence did not exceed 14 days during 1997.  On that record, we               
          find that the Doon Way residence qualifies within the meaning of            
          section 280A(d)(1) as petitioners’ “residence” during 1997.                 


               15At trial, Ms. Stoddard also testified that “we were stay-            
          ing on the boat [Quissett] right after the casualty loss [to the            
          Quissett].  We had it in the boatyard.  We were–-we were being              
          stalked, and we basically moved out of the house and put it up              
          for rent.”  On the record before us, we find that petitioners               
          have failed to establish (1) that they did not live in the Doon             
          Way residence after the Quissett was seized and sold in May 1997            
          and (2) that during 1997 they owned property in addition to the             
          Doon Way residence in which they resided.                                   




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