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there; therefore, respondent argues that the Galena airport must
be physically located on an Indian reservation “per se” in order
to qualify for the IEC.
We begin our analysis with the well-established rule that
statutory construction begins with the language of the relevant
statute. Consumer Prod. Safety Commn. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447
U.S. 102, 108 (1980). Statutes are to be read so as to give
effect to their plain and ordinary meaning unless to do so would
produce absurd or futile results. United States v. Am. Trucking
Associations, Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940); see Tamarisk
Country Club v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 756, 761 (1985). We may
use legislative history to clarify an ambiguous statute.
Burlington N. R.R. v. Okla. Tax Commn., 481 U.S. 454, 461 (1987);
City of New York v. Commissioner, 103 T.C. 481, 489 (1994), affd.
70 F.3d 142 (D.C. Cir. 1995). From the face of the statute, it
is not clear what is meant by “within”. We therefore examine the
legislative history to clarify the language.
The House conference report accompanying the enactment of
the section providing for the IEC referred to the IEC and to a
related provision as “Tax incentives for businesses on Indian
reservations.” H. Conf. Rept. 103-213, at 718 (1993) (emphasis
added). Further, the conference report described the Senate
amendment as follows: “Under the Senate amendment, businesses
located on Indian reservations generally are allowed a credit
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