Jeffrey and Karen Winter - Page 15




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               taxpayer argued in this Court that he could deduct                     
               $10,960 of the expenses because they were attributable                 
               to a hearing held by the Federal Communications                        
               Commission on this matter and did not add any value to                 
               the acquired stock.  We disagreed with the taxpayer                    
               that any of these amounts were currently deductible.                   
               On appeal, so did the Court of Appeals for the Ninth                   
               Circuit.  According to that court: “The expenditures                   
               connected with the acquisition of the broadcast license                
               were no less capital in character because they did not                 
               themselves contribute additional and specific financial                
               value to the license being sought.  The important fact                 
               is that the expenditures were made for the purpose of                  
               acquiring a capital asset.” * * * [Fn. ref. omitted.]                  
          We noted that the test for capitalization does not hinge on the             
          amount of value added to property but looks at the nature of the            
          expense itself.  Id. at 414.  We concluded that “When the nature            
          of an expenditure bears a direct relation to the acquisition of a           
          capital asset * * * the expenditure must be capitalized.”  Id.              
               Petitioners acquired a capital asset.  Petitioners                     
          subsequently discovered that they paid more for the asset than it           
          was worth.  Petitioners initiated a lawsuit against MHP and Mr.             
          Meglin and sought to recover damages on the grounds that                    
          misrepresentations by Mr. Meglin had caused them to pay more than           
          the hotel was worth.  Petitioners and Mr. Meglin eventually                 
          entered into a release and settlement agreement whereby                     
          petitioners’ obligation under the promissory note executed for              












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