Michael T. Carey and Leone R. Carey - Page 8

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               1.   Whether Petitioners’ Trusts Are Recognized for Federal            
                    Tax Purposes                                                      
               Respondent contends that petitioners’ trusts should not be             
          recognized for Federal income tax purposes because they are                 
          shams.  Petitioners contend that petitioners’ trusts are not                
          shams.  A trust may be a sham for Federal tax purposes if the               
          grantor retains control over the property or income placed in the           
          trust and does not change how the property or income is treated.            
          Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 604 (1948); United States             
          v. Noske, 117 F.3d 1053, 1059 (8th Cir. 1997).  We generally do             
          not recognize a trust for Federal tax purposes if the grantor               
          keeps substantially unfettered powers of disposition or                     
          beneficial enjoyment of trust property.  See United States v.               
          Noske, supra; Paulson v. Commissioner, 992 F.2d 789, 790 (8th               
          Cir. 1993), affg. per curiam T.C. Memo. 1991-508; United States             
          v. Buttorff, 761 F.2d 1056, 1061 (5th Cir. 1985); Schulz v.                 
          Commissioner, 686 F.2d 490, 495 (7th Cir. 1982), affg. T.C. Memo.           
          1980-568; Vnuk v. Commissioner, 621 F.2d 1318, 1320-1321 (8th               
          Cir. 1980), affg. T.C. Memo. 1979-164.                                      
               Petitioners controlled and dealt with the alleged trust                
          property as if it were their own.  Petitioner retained                      
          substantial enjoyment of the trust property as shown by the fact            
          that he had signature authority over the bank accounts of                   
          petitioners’ trusts in 1996 and for part of 1997, and that he               
          paid his personal expenses from those bank accounts in 1997.                





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