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Fisher v. Commissioner, supra, and Estate of Satin v.
Commissioner, supra, “in which” counsel for the taxpayers and
respondent’s counsel signed the piggyback agreement. Neither
petitioners’ counsel (or counsel for the general partner) in this
case nor respondent’s counsel executed a piggyback agreement.
Petitioners’ contention that the protest letter approximates a
piggyback agreement is mistaken. At best, the protest letter
indicates an intention that petitioners might be willing to enter
into a formal piggyback agreement, but nothing in the record
indicates that petitioners followed up on any such intent.
The protest letter itself indicates an intention “to follow
the Tax Court’s decision in the lead cases” but omits any mention
of following a settlement of the lead cases, although that
possibility is specifically mentioned in paragraph 5 of the
piggyback agreement. Moreover, within a month after the Miller
settlement was executed, Becker as TMP, having become aware of
that settlement, submitted to respondent a clarification that SAB
Foam did not wish to be bound by the settlement and, therefore,
withdrew any statement of intention to be bound by any other
case.
The facts of this case are that petitioners’ TMP did not
execute the piggyback agreement. Instead he made it clear that
he did not wish to settle the case but to rely upon the results
of litigation. Petitioners’ unpersuasive argument is that, now
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