David D. Le, a.k.a. David Dung Le, a.k.a. Dung V. Le and Kim Huong Le, a.k.a. Kim Le, et al. - Page 27

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          the Les.  Accordingly, we sustain respondent’s determination that           
          the Les, as transferees, are liable for DDL’s unpaid 1990 and               
          1991 income tax liabilities (inclusive of penalties).14                     
          E.  Period of Limitations                                                   
               Respondent generally must assess tax against individual                
          taxpayers such as the Les within 3 years of the later of the due            
          date or filing date of their return.  Sec. 6501(a) and (b)(1);              
          Mecom v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. 374, 382 (1993), affd. without              
          published opinion 40 F.3d 385 (5th Cir. 1994).  One exception to            
          this general rule is that in the case of a “false or fraudulent             
          return” with the intent to evade tax, the tax may be assessed at            
          any time.  Sec. 6501(c)(1).  Respondent bears the burden of                 
          proving fraud in this context.  Sec. 7454(a); Rule 142(b).  In              
          that we have already concluded above that respondent has met his            
          burden of proof as to fraud in each year, we conclude that                  
          assessment of petitioners’ 1990 and 1991 tax liabilities is not             
          barred by the statute of limitations.15                                     


               14 Because we find that petitioners had the actual intent to           
          defraud the Government, we do not need to address whether there             
          was constructive fraud under Cal. Civ. Code sec. 3439.04(b) (West           
          1997).                                                                      
               15 Respondent alternatively argued that the period of                  
          limitations has not run because the Les’ omission of income was             
          “substantial” under sec. 6501(e)(1)(A).  We need not and do not             
          consider this argument.  We also need not and do not consider               
          respondent’s other alternative argument that the period of                  
          limitations for 1991 remains open given the timely extension for            
          that year.  See sec. 6501(c)(4).                                            





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