Scott David Duby - Page 6




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          Regs., 49 Fed. Reg. 34459 (Aug. 31, 1984).2                                 
               The divorce decree, in effect since 1997, granted Aguirre              
          sole custody of the children until the divorce court granted                
          petitioner temporary custody, in a subsequent custody decree,               
          actually issued on September 10, 1999, and purportedly effective            
          as of July 27, 1999.3  Although petitioner did not have physical            
          custody of the children, the child custody order provided                   
          petitioner with temporary custody for the balance of the year               
          (July 27, 1999 to Dec. 31, 1999).  Petitioner himself admitted:             
          “I don’t meet the six months criteria”.  Since Aguirre had                  
          custody for the greater portion of the year, Aguirre is the                 
          custodial parent for 1999.  Accordingly, Aguirre is entitled to             
          claim the dependency exemption deductions for the children unless           
          one of the three exceptions in section 152 applies.  See Miller             
          v. Commissioner, supra at 188; see also Cafarelli v.                        


               2  Temporary regulations are entitled to the same weight as            
          final regulations.  Peterson Marital Trust v. Commissioner, 102             
          T.C. 790, 797 (1994), affd. 78 F.3d 795 (2d Cir. 1996); Truck &             
          Equip. Corp. v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 141, 149 (1992).                      
               3  The parties filed a Stipulation of Facts stating that the           
          change of custody took place on July 1, 1999.  However, although            
          the hearing was conducted on July 1, 1999, the divorce court                
          issued the child custody order, transferring custody to                     
          petitioner, on Sept. 10, 1999, nunc pro tunc to July 27, 1999.              
          While stipulations are not to be set aside lightly, the Court is            
          not bound by stipulations of fact that appear contrary to the               
          facts disclosed by the record.  See Rule 91(e); Estate of Eddy v.           
          Commissioner, 115 T.C. 135, 137 n.4 (2000) (citing Blohm v.                 
          Commissioner, 994 F.2d 1542, 1553 (11th Cir. 1993), affg. T.C.              
          Memo. 1991-636).  At the earliest, the change of custody occurred           
          on July 27, 1999.                                                           





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