Richard Scott Gehrs - Page 8

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          7430(c)(4)(A)(i).  And in the case of an individual taxpayer, the           
          term also means any party which had a net worth that did not                
          exceed $2,000,000 at the time the civil tax case proceeding was             
          commenced.  Sec. 7430(c)(4)(A)(ii) (referring to 28 U.S.C. sec.             
          2412(d)(1)(B) and (2)(B)).  However, a party shall not be treated           
          as the prevailing party if the Commissioner establishes that his            
          position was substantially justified.  Sec. 7430(c)(4)(B).                  
               Respondent contends that petitioner is not the prevailing              
          party within the meaning of section 7430(c)(4) because, while               
          respondent conceded the case, his position was substantially                
          justified.2  The Commissioner’s position is substantially                   
          justified if, based on all of the facts and circumstances and the           
          legal precedents relating to the case, the Commissioner acted               
          reasonably.  Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552 (1988); Sher v.              
          Commissioner, 89 T.C. 79, 84 (1987), affd. 861 F.2d 131 (5th Cir.           
          1988).  In other words, to be substantially justified, the                  
          Commissioner’s position must have a reasonable basis in both law            
          and fact.  Pierce v. Underwood, supra; Rickel v. Commissioner,              
          900 F.2d 655, 665 (3d Cir. 1990), affg. in part and revg. in part           
          on other grounds 92 T.C. 510 (1989).  A position is substantially           
          justified if the position is “justified to a degree that could              


               2  As discussed above, respondent also contends that                   
          petitioner unreasonably protracted the proceedings.  As a result            
          of our conclusion herein, we need not address respondent’s                  
          additional contention.                                                      





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