Indeck Energy Services, Inc., and Subsidiaries - Page 33




                                       - 33 -                                         
          that purchase price.  The parties’ use of that formula was not              
          tantamount to an agreement to pay $15,030,000 for the shares and            
          the remainder as interest.  Accordingly, the facts and                      
          circumstances surrounding the settlement do not suggest that the            
          parties’ allocation fails to reflect the reality of their                   
          agreement.  See Bagley v. Commissioner, 105 T.C. 396 (1995);                
          Robinson v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 1161 (1994).                             
               In support of its position that the written allocation of              
          the entire payment to purchase price should be ignored, Indeck              
          cites Rozpad v. Commissioner, 154 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1998), affg.             
          T.C. Memo. 1997-528, Delaney v. Commissioner, 99 F.3d 20 (1st               
          Cir. 1996), affg. T.C. Memo. 1995-378, and Smith v. Commissioner,           
          59 T.C. 107 (1972), cases where the courts disregarded the                  
          absence of an allocation to interest in written settlement                  
          agreements or a court order and instead found that a portion of             
          the payment included interest income to the payee.14                        
               Indeck’s case is easily distinguishable.  We note first that           
          the payor and payee in Rozpad, Delaney, and Smith were not tax              
          adverse regarding the characterization of any portion of the                
          payment as interest.  Also, the taxpayers in Rozpad and Delaney             

               14 Indeck also cites Kovacs v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 124              
          (1993), affd. without published opinion 25 F.3d 1048 (6th Cir.              
          1994), but we believe that case is of marginal relevance.  In               
          Kovacs, the issue was not whether interest formed some portion of           
          a payment, but whether amounts conceded to be interest should be            
          treated as part of the damages received on account of personal              
          injury and therefore excludable from income under sec. 104(a)(2).           





Page:  Previous  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  Next

Last modified: May 25, 2011