Indeck Energy Services, Inc., and Subsidiaries - Page 54




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          Conclusion                                                                  
               Based on the foregoing, we sustain respondent’s                        
          determination disallowing a $4,856,922 interest deduction claimed           
          by Indeck on its return for the taxable year ended in 1994 and do           
          not sustain respondent’s determination recharacterizing, as                 
          interest income, $4,856,922 of $19,866,922 reported by the                  
          Polskys on their 1994 return as long-term capital gain.                     
          Section 6662 Accuracy-Related Penalty                                       
               Respondent determined section 6662(a) accuracy-related                 
          penalties against all petitioners for their taxable years ended             


               21(...continued)                                                       
          to preclude the Polskys from maintaining that the entire                    
          settlement payment consisted of purchase price for Mr. Polsky’s             
          shares.  We do not consider this issue, as it has not been                  
          properly raised in these cases.  Issues raised for the first time           
          in posttrial briefs are not considered where there is surprise              
          and prejudice to the opposing party.  Seligman v. Commissioner,             
          84 T.C. 191, 198-199 (1985), affd. 796 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1986).            
          Where as here the issue is raised for the first time in a reply             
          brief, the prejudice is manifest; neither the Polskys nor                   
          respondent had any opportunity to respond to Indeck’s attempt to            
          raise equitable estoppel.                                                   
               Even if this issue had been properly raised, we would reject           
          Indeck’s argument.  Indeck claims equitable estoppel should apply           
          here because Mr. Polsky’s attorneys represented to Indeck’s                 
          attorneys that the changes sought by Mr. Polsky in the language             
          of the Settlement Agreement, whereby the three components of the            
          settlement payment were re-labeled “purchase price”, were “non-             
          substantive”.  Suffice it to say that if Mr. Polsky’s attorneys             
          in fact characterized the language changes as alleged, their                
          statements concerned matters of opinion or law, not fact.  Cf.              
          Union Tex. Intl. Corp. v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 321, 327 (1998)            
          (party seeking equitable estoppel must show, inter alia, that it            
          relied on a misrepresentation of fact, as opposed to an opinion             
          or statement of law).                                                       





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