- 7 -
To the extent that the above-referenced orders allocate
physical custody of petitioner’s son between petitioner and Ms.
Bonner for specific periods, the days included within those
periods are counted, respectively, as days of physical custody
for either petitioner or Ms. Bonner for purposes of section
152(e). Because the relevant orders specifically provide for
physical custody of petitioner’s son for every day of the year,
contrary to petitioner’s position, it is not necessary to
determine where petitioner’s son lived on any given day during
1998. Under the circumstances of this case, the reference to
“physical custody” in the regulation does not mean physical
presence. Furthermore, days of visitation are not counted as
days of physical custody.
The above-referenced orders establish that Ms. Bonner’s
physical custody of petitioner’s son exceeded petitioner’s during
1998. Consequently, petitioner is not considered to be his son’s
custodial parent for that year. Petitioner’s son, therefore, is
not treated as having received over half of his support from
petitioner and does not fit within the definition of a dependent
for purposes of the dependency exemption deduction here in
dispute. It follows that petitioner is not entitled to a
dependency exemption deduction for his son for 1998, and
respondent’s determination disallowing that deduction is
sustained.
Page: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Next
Last modified: May 25, 2011