- 10 -
235, 242 (1989); Ewing v. Commissioner, supra at 503. If the
statute is silent or ambiguous, then we may look to the
legislative history to determine congressional intent.
Burlington N. R.R. v. Okla. Tax Commn., 481 U.S. 454, 461 (1987);
Fernandez v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 324, 329-330 (2000). The
legislative history of a statute is secondary when we can apply
the plain meaning of unambiguous text; however, unequivocal
evidence of clear legislative intent may sometimes override a
plain meaning interpretation and lead to a different result.
Allen v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 1, 17 (2002) (and cases cited
thereat); Nordtvedt v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 165, 169 (2001),
affd. without published opinion 22 Fed. Appx. 790 (9th Cir.
2001).
Section 152(e)(1) provides that the special support test
applies to “parents” in three different situations. The statute
specifically provides that the test applies not only to divorced
and certain separated parents, but to parents “who live apart at
all times during the last 6 months of the calendar year”. There
is no requirement in the statute that parents have married each
other before the special support test can apply. Section
152(e)(1) applies to any parents, regardless of marital status,
as long as they lived apart at all times for at least the last 6
months of the calendar year.
Respondent contends that the legislative history of section
152(e) supports the interpretation that section 152(e)(1)(A)(iii)
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