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21, and we see no reason to restate those here. Suffice it to
say, we adhere to our opinion in that case.
There is one argument that petitioner makes here that we did
not specifically address in our prior opinion. Petitioner
requests “the Court to give an opinion or rule that the decision
is discriminatory; they discriminate on age. If you’re a young
man, it’s [petitioner’s annuity payment] not taxable before 65,
but if you’re an old man, after 65, it [petitioner’s annuity
payment] becomes taxable.” We characterize petitioner’s argument
as a Fifth Amendment challenge; specifically, that the tax
violates the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment.2
The taxes on petitioner’s annuity payments and Social
Security benefits, however, do not “interfere with the exercise
of a fundamental right, such as freedom of speech, or employ a
suspect classification, such as race.” Regan v. Taxation With
Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 547 (1983). Age classification is
not a suspect classification for equal protection analysis.
Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979); Mass. Bd. of Ret. v.
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312-314 (1976). Accordingly, our review is
limited to whether there is a rational basis for the
2 The Due Process Clause has been construed as imposing an
equal protection requirement in respect of classification to the
extent that "discrimination [resulting from such classification]
may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process."
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
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