Curtis J.L. McIntosh - Page 18

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          Court’s reasoning, that respondent mailed the April 26, 1993,               
          notice and demand to petitioner’s last known address.                       
               In light of our holding in this regard, we need not and do             
          not decide the effect, if any, of respondent’s alleged failure to           
          provide petitioner notice and demand within 60 days pursuant to             
          section 6303(a).7                                                           

               7 Sec. 301.6303-1(a), Proced. & Admin. Regs., provides that            
          notice under sec. 6303(a) shall be given “as soon as possible and           
          within 60 days.  However, the failure to give notice within 60              
          days does not invalidate the notice.”  In several cases, without            
          expressly addressing the effect of the IRS’s failure to give                
          notice within 60 days of the subject assessment, this Court has             
          treated notice that was provided more than 60 days after the                
          subject assessment as satisfying, in whole or part, the notice              
          requirement of sec. 6303(a).  See Perez v. Commissioner, T.C.               
          Memo. 2002-274; Hack v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-244; Hack             
          v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-243; Mudd v. Commissioner, T.C.            
          Memo. 2002-204.  These decisions are consistent with decisions of           
          various other courts holding that notice provided more than 60              
          days after the subject assessment date satisfies the sec. 6303(a)           
          notice requirement.  See Ramos v. United States, 84 AFTR 2d 99-             
          6402, 99-2 USTC par. 50,878 (N.D. Cal. 1999); Schupp v. United              
          States, 71 AFTR 2d 93-917, 93-1 USTC par. 50,215 (E.D. Tex.                 
          1993), affd. without published opinion 58 F.3d 636 (5th Cir.                
          1995); Erickson v. United States, 780 F. Supp. 733 (W.D. Wash.              
          1990), affd. without published opinion 952 F.2d 1399 (9th Cir.              
          1992).  On the other hand, various other courts have held that              
          the IRS’s failure to give notice within 60 days of the subject              
          assessment date bars the IRS from exercising its nonjudicial                
          collection powers but does not preclude the IRS from reducing the           
          subject assessment to judgment in a civil action.  See Blackston            
          v. United States, 778 F. Supp. 244 (D. Md. 1991); Behren v.                 
          United States, 764 F. Supp. 180, 183 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (stating              
          that sec. 301.6303-1(a), Proced. & Admin. Regs., “insofar as it             
          directly controverts statutory and case authority, is without any           
          precedential value”), affd. on this issue without published                 
          opinion 992 F.2d 328 (11th Cir. 1993), on remand 74 AFTR 2d 94-             
          6370 (S.D. Fla. 1994); Dewberry v. United States, 158 Bankr. 979,           
          982 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1993); cf. Jersey Shore State Bank v.                
          United States, 479 U.S. 442 (1987) (the Government is not                   
                                                             (continued...)           





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