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Court’s reasoning, that respondent mailed the April 26, 1993,
notice and demand to petitioner’s last known address.
In light of our holding in this regard, we need not and do
not decide the effect, if any, of respondent’s alleged failure to
provide petitioner notice and demand within 60 days pursuant to
section 6303(a).7
7 Sec. 301.6303-1(a), Proced. & Admin. Regs., provides that
notice under sec. 6303(a) shall be given “as soon as possible and
within 60 days. However, the failure to give notice within 60
days does not invalidate the notice.” In several cases, without
expressly addressing the effect of the IRS’s failure to give
notice within 60 days of the subject assessment, this Court has
treated notice that was provided more than 60 days after the
subject assessment as satisfying, in whole or part, the notice
requirement of sec. 6303(a). See Perez v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2002-274; Hack v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-244; Hack
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-243; Mudd v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2002-204. These decisions are consistent with decisions of
various other courts holding that notice provided more than 60
days after the subject assessment date satisfies the sec. 6303(a)
notice requirement. See Ramos v. United States, 84 AFTR 2d 99-
6402, 99-2 USTC par. 50,878 (N.D. Cal. 1999); Schupp v. United
States, 71 AFTR 2d 93-917, 93-1 USTC par. 50,215 (E.D. Tex.
1993), affd. without published opinion 58 F.3d 636 (5th Cir.
1995); Erickson v. United States, 780 F. Supp. 733 (W.D. Wash.
1990), affd. without published opinion 952 F.2d 1399 (9th Cir.
1992). On the other hand, various other courts have held that
the IRS’s failure to give notice within 60 days of the subject
assessment date bars the IRS from exercising its nonjudicial
collection powers but does not preclude the IRS from reducing the
subject assessment to judgment in a civil action. See Blackston
v. United States, 778 F. Supp. 244 (D. Md. 1991); Behren v.
United States, 764 F. Supp. 180, 183 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (stating
that sec. 301.6303-1(a), Proced. & Admin. Regs., “insofar as it
directly controverts statutory and case authority, is without any
precedential value”), affd. on this issue without published
opinion 992 F.2d 328 (11th Cir. 1993), on remand 74 AFTR 2d 94-
6370 (S.D. Fla. 1994); Dewberry v. United States, 158 Bankr. 979,
982 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1993); cf. Jersey Shore State Bank v.
United States, 479 U.S. 442 (1987) (the Government is not
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