Stephen G. and Karen P. Shaltz - Page 9

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          not considered a physical injury or physical sickness, except               
          that an exclusion may be allowed to the amount paid for medical             
          care attributable to the emotional distress); see also United               
          States v. Burke, 504 U.S. at 237 (stating that former section               
          104(a)(2)’s reference to personal injuries “encompasses * * *               
          nonphysical injuries to the individual, such as those affecting             
          emotions, reputation, or character”); Greer v. United States,               
          supra at 328; Garrett v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-70.  See             
          generally Black’s Law Dictionary 542 (7th ed. 1999) (“emotional             
          distress” denotes “A highly unpleasant mental reaction (such as             
          anguish, grief, fright, humiliation, or fury) that results from             
          another person’s conduct; emotional pain and suffering.”).  We              
          conclude that none of petitioner’s net settlement payment is                
          attributable to personal physical injuries or physical sickness             
          and hold that none of that payment may be excluded from                     
          petitioners’ gross income under section 104(a)(2).5  In so doing,           
          we note that the record does not establish the intent of GM in              
          making any or all of the settlement payment to petitioner.6                 

               5 Petitioners make no claim that any part of the net                   
          settlement amount was received by petitioner as damages for                 
          expenses paid for medical care attributable to emotional                    
          distress.  Nor are we able to find that such was the case.                  
          Accordingly, we also conclude that the flush language of sec.               
          104(a) is inapplicable.                                                     
               6 Petitioners introduced into evidence a letter from the               
          Social Security Administration showing that petitioner was                  
          eligible for disability payments during 1998.  The record is                
                                                             (continued...)           





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