- 24 -
all the facts and circumstances, we conclude that (1) respondent’s
denial of relief under section 6015(f) was an abuse of discretion,
and (2) that it would be inequitable to hold petitioner liable for
the unpaid 1989 tax liability. See Ferrarese v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2002-249; August v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-201; Foley
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1995-16; Klimenko v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1993-340; Hillman v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1993-151.8
B. Whether Petitioner Is Entitled to Refunds for Amounts Paid on
or Before July 22, 1998
Since we have concluded that it would be inequitable to hold
petitioner liable for the unpaid 1989 tax liability, we now must
decide whether petitioner is entitled to the refund of amounts
paid on/applied to the unpaid 1989 tax liability.
8 Cases deciding whether a taxpayer was entitled to
equitable relief under sec. 6013(e)(1)(D) are helpful in deciding
whether a taxpayer is entitled to relief under sec. 6015(f).
Mitchell v. Commissioner, 292 F.3d 800, 806 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
(“Subsection (f) has no statutory antecedent as a stand alone
provision, but has roots in the equity test of former subparagraph
6015(b)(1)(D) carried forward into subparagraph 6015(b)(1)(D).”),
affg. T.C. Memo. 2002-332. In Cheshire v. Commissioner, 282 F.3d
326, 338 n.29 (5th Cir. 2002), affg. 115 T.C. 183 (2000), the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated:
Because the wording of � 6015(f)(1) is virtually
identical to that of former � 6013(e)(1)(D), case law
construing former � 6013(e)(1)(D) is helpful in
determining whether the Commissioner abused his
discretion in denying equitable relief to Appellant under
current � 6015(f)(1). See Butler v. Commissioner, 114
T.C. at 291 (applying the � 6013(e)(1)(D) standard to a
� 6015(f) inquiry because ‘the language of sec.
6015(f)(1) does not differ significantly from the
language of former sec. 6013(e)(1)(D)’).
Page: Previous 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 NextLast modified: May 25, 2011