Stephan Bartsch and Eva Bartsch, a.k.a. Eva Pott Bartsch - Page 9

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               As discussed above, petitioner’s former residence for                  
          purposes of section 217 was New York City.  Therefore, we hold              
          that petitioner is not entitled to deduct his travel expenses               
          from Zurich to San Francisco.  See sec. 217(b)(1)(B).5                      
               C.  Cost of Travel for Mrs. Bartsch from Switzerland to                
               San Francisco                                                          
               Mrs. Bartsch moved to Berkeley to enroll in a clinical                 
          residency program at Stanford University.  Mrs. Bartsch did not             
          move to Berkeley in connection with the commencement of work as             
          an employee.  Accordingly, Mrs. Bartsch’s travel cost from Zurich           
          to San Francisco is not deductible under section 217(a).                    
               In addition, section 217(b)(2) provides that a taxpayer may            
          deduct the expenses incurred in moving a member of the taxpayer’s           
          household if such individual has both the former residence and              
          the new residence as his principal place of abode.  See also sec.           
          1.217-2(b)(10)(i), Income Tax Regs.  A member of the taxpayer’s             
          household includes any individual residing at the taxpayer’s                
          residence who is neither a tenant nor an employee of the                    


               5  Although petitioner’s travel expenses from New York City            
          to San Francisco might otherwise be a deductible expense under              
          sec. 217(b)(1)(B), petitioner has failed to substantiate such an            
          expense.  Petitioner offered no documentary evidence, such as a             
          canceled check, receipt, credit card statement, or airline                  
          ticket, nor does the record negate the possibility that some                
          portion of petitioner’s travel expenses might have been subject             
          to reimbursement.  Accordingly, we decline to invoke the rule in            
          Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1930), to estimate              
          the travel expense to which petitioner might be entitled because            
          the record provides no basis for making such an estimate.                   





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