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the debtor’s opportunity for rehabilitation, without providing
any particular benefit to the estate or the estate’s creditors.
Our analysis of this matter is focused on the facts before
us. On the basis of those facts and in accord with established
bankruptcy case precedent, we hold that termination of
petitioner’s bankruptcy estate occurred at the time of the
confirmation of the plan of reorganization. In reaching this
holding, we do not attempt to establish a “bright-line rule”
under which all chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganizations would
“terminate”, within the meaning of section 1398(i), at the time
of the plan’s confirmation. The circumstances of each case
should dictate whether a “termination” has occurred.
In prior Memorandum Opinions of this Court, the view was
expressed that the phrase “termination of an estate”, as used in
section 1398(i), should be the same as or compatible with the
phrase closing of the estate as used in section 346(i)(2) of the
Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. section 346(i)(2) (2000). See McGuirl
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-21; Beery v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1996-464; cf. Firsdon v. United States, 95 F.3d 444, 446
(6th Cir. 1996); Banks v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-48, affd.
in part, revd. in part and remanded 345 F.3d 373 (6th Cir. 2003);
Gulley v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-190; Kahle v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-91. However, all of those cases
either began as chapter 7 liquidations or were converted from
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