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nontaxable income and/or he was entitled to additional
deductions, but he failed to take advantage of that opportunity.
Petitioner did not present at trial even a scintilla of
evidence to prove error in respondent’s computations. Petitioner
chose, instead, to assert the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination. Assuming this was a valid assertion of the
privilege, it is not a substitute for evidence and is not
“intended to be * * * a sword whereby a claimant asserting the
privilege would be freed from adducing proof in support of a
burden which would otherwise have been his.” United States v.
Rylander, 460 U.S. 752, 758 (1983); Tweeddale v. Commissioner,
841 F.2d 643, 645 (5th Cir. 1988), affg. T.C. Memo. 1987-197;
Petzoldt v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 661, 684 (1989). In a civil
tax case, the taxpayer cannot avoid the burden of proof by
asserting the Fifth Amendment privilege. United States v.
Rylander, supra at 758; see Steinbrecher v. Commissioner, 712
F.2d 195, 198 (5th Cir. 1983), affg. T.C. Memo. 1983-12;
Traficant v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 501 (1987), affd. 884 F.2d 258
(6th Cir. 1989); Wheelis v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-102,
affd. 63 Fed. Appx. 375 (9th Cir. 2003).
In view of all the evidence, we hold that resort to the bank
deposits method was necessary to determine petitioner’s income
for the taxable years involved and that respondent properly
applied this method in determining that income. Therefore, we
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