Brian Timothy Brunner - Page 9

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          III. Constitutionality of the Filing Requirement                            
               Our tax system, the Code, and the Tax Court have been firmly           
          established as constitutional.  Crain v. Commissioner, 737 F.2d             
          1417, 1417-1418 (5th Cir. 1984); Ginter v. Southern, 611 F.2d               
          1226, 1229 (8th Cir. 1979).  Furthermore, each of petitioner’s              
          specific constitutional arguments has been resoundingly rejected            
          by the courts.  See, e.g., 4th Amendment--Edwards v.                        
          Commissioner, 680 F.2d 1268, 1270 (9th Cir. 1982) (“Requiring               
          taxpayers, who institute civil proceedings protesting deficiency            
          notices, to produce records or face dismissal constitutes no                
          invasion of privacy or unlawful search and seizure”);4 5th                  
          Amendment--United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259, 263 (1927)              
          (ruling that taxpayers cannot use the Fifth Amendment to “refuse            
          to make any return at all”);5 9th Amendment--Tingle v.                      
          Commissioner, 73 T.C. 816, 816 (1980)(ruling that the Ninth                 
          Amendment was “not intended to abridge the specific power of                


               4 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), relied on by             
          petitioner, is inapplicable in that the case dealt exclusively              
          with a criminal, rather than a civil, matter.  See also Mapp v.             
          Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)(same); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S.           
          383 (1914)(same).                                                           
               5 In order for an individual to claim the applicability of             
          the privilege against self-incrimination, there must be a “real             
          and appreciable danger” from the “substantial hazards of self               
          incrimination”, and the individual must have “reasonable cause to           
          apprehend [such] danger from a direct answer to questions posed             
          to him”.  Neff v. Commissioner, 615 F.2d 1235, 1239 (9th Cir.               
          1980) (quoting Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486                  
          (1951)).                                                                    





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