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reviewed on appeal. The requirement derived from a
belief that an appellate court’s mandate bars the trial
court from later disturbing the judgment entered in
accordance with the mandate. It has also been argued
that the appellate-leave requirement protects the
finality of the judgment and allows the appellate court
to screen out frivolous Rule 60(b) motions. [Id. at 18;
fn. ref. and citations omitted.]
The Supreme Court, however, held:
In our view, the arguments in favor of requiring
appellate leave are unpersuasive. Like the original
district court judgment, the appellate mandate relates
to the record and issues then before the court, and
does not purport to deal with possible later events.
Hence, the district judge is not flouting the mandate
by acting on the motion. Furthermore, the interest in
finality is no more impaired in this situation than in
any Rule 60(b) proceeding. Finally, we have confidence
in the ability of the district courts to recognize
frivolous Rule 60(b) motions. Indeed, the trial court
“is in a much better position to pass upon the issues
presented in a motion pursuant to Rule 60(b)”.
The appellate-leave requirement adds to the delay
and expense of litigation and also burdens the
increasingly scarce time of the federal appellate
courts. We see no reason to continue the existence of
this “unnecessary and undesirable clog on the
proceedings.” [Id. at 18-19; citations omitted.]
In light of Standard Oil Co. of Cal., we conclude that Lydon
v. Commissioner, supra, and its progeny are no longer viable. In
Lydon we analogized the situation to that of a district court
under rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
relied on, inter alia, Hazel-Atlas Co. v. Hartford Co., 322 U.S.
238 (1944), Tribble v. Bruin, 279 F.2d 424 (4th Cir. 1960), and
Home Indem. Co. v. O’Brien, 112 F.2d 387 (6th Cir. 1940). The
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