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petitioners. As we discuss below, petitioners’ arguments are not
persuasive.
Clawson testified as to, inter alia, the “soft” real estate
market since the Cape Coral property had been listed for sale in
August 2001, petitioners’ inability to borrow any further against
the Cape Coral property, petitioners’ business dealings between
August 2001 and October 2002, and his understanding of the order
of permanent injunction and the modified asset freeze contained
therein. Much of Clawson’s testimony, on cross-examination,
admitted dispositions of assets and increased borrowing against
the Cape Coral property without application of any of the
proceeds to petitioners’ tax obligations. This evidence, had it
been presented to Luhmann, is not likely to have changed his
determination and does not show an abuse of discretion. See,
e.g., Pless v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-24.
There is no requirement that an Appeals officer take notes
at a section 6330 hearing, and there is neither requirement nor
reason that the Appeals officer wait a certain amount of time
before rendering his determination as to a proposed levy. See
sec. 301.6330-1(d)(2), Q&A-D6, Proced. & Admin. Regs.; sec.
301.6330-1(e)(3), Q&A-E9, Proced. & Admin. Regs. Moreover, Riley
worked with petitioners for more than 1 year before their case
was assigned to Luhmann. Accordingly, we reject petitioners’
argument that Luhmann abused his discretion on those grounds.
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