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decided before relevant Supreme Court decisions applying the
substitute for ordinary income doctrine. Hrobon v. Commissioner,
41 T.C. 476, 493, 497-498 (1964). As explained in numerous
Supreme Court cases and the recent decisions discussed above, the
fact that certain property is not within the statutory exclusions
for capital assets does not automatically mean that the property
is a capital asset. See, e.g., Ark. Best Corp. v. Commissioner,
485 U.S. 212, 217 n.5 (1988); Commissioner v. Gillette Motor
Transp., Inc., 364 U.S. 130, 134 (1960); Commissioner v. P.G.
Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260, 265 (1958); United States v. Maginnis,
supra at 1181-1182; Davis v. Commissioner, 119 T.C. at 7. If
lump-sum consideration received for the property is essentially a
substitute for what would otherwise be received at a future time
as ordinary income, then the consideration may not be taxed as a
capital gain. Commissioner v. P.G. Lake, Inc., supra at 265;
United States v. Maginnis, supra at 1182. The appropriate
inquiry in this case is whether the $1,155,000 received for the
property transferred to Singer was essentially a substitute for
future payments of ordinary income.
Petitioners claim that Mr. Clopton transferred a beneficial
interest in the trust, not the right to future lottery payments,
and that the interest is a capital asset. Petitioners claim that
the future payments were required to be made directly to the
trust, not to Singer. Petitioners imply that this means that
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