- 13 -
by the statute to prescribe the exclusive method by which tax
cases could be compromised” and noted that specification of a
particular mode “includes the negative of any other mode.” Id.
at 288-289.
As one example of this general foreclosure of nonstatutory
alternatives, it has been explained:
the provisions for compromising tax cases are found in
�� 7121 and 7122 of the Internal Revenue Code. These
provisions are exclusive and strictly construed. See
Botany Worsted Mills v. United States, 1928, 278 U.S.
282, 49 S.Ct. 129, 73 L.Ed. 379. Because of this
exclusive method, no theory founded upon general
concepts of accord and satisfaction can be used to
impute a compromise settlement, Moskowitz v. United
States, 285 F.2d 451, 453, 152 Ct.Cl. 412 (1961), and
therefore none resulted from the government’s
acceptance and cashing of appellant’s check. * * *
[Bowling v. United States, 510 F.2d 112, 113 (5th Cir.
1975).]
See also Urbano v. Commissioner, supra at ___ (slip op. at 17).
However, the Supreme Court in Botany Worsted Mills v. United
States, supra at 289, left open the question of whether in
limited circumstances equitable estoppel might be applied in the
context of an otherwise unenforceable agreement, as follows:
And, without determining whether such an agreement,
though not binding in itself, may when executed become,
under some circumstances, binding on the parties by
estoppel, it suffices to say that here the findings
disclose no adequate ground for any claim of estoppel
by the United States.
Accordingly, this and other courts have considered estoppel
arguments. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 328 F.3d 760, 765-
766 (5th Cir. 2003) (and cases cited thereat); Boulez v.
Page: Previous 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 NextLast modified: May 25, 2011