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Commissioner, 112 T.C. 317, 323 (1999), affd. without published
opinion 242 F.3d 390 (10th Cir. 2000). However, the “instrument
must contain a clear, explicit and express direction” that the
payments are not to be treated as alimony. Richardson v.
Commissioner, 125 F.3d 551, 556 (7th Cir. 1997), affg. T.C. Memo.
1995-554. The Amended Order does not contain such language, and
section 71(b)(1)(B) is satisfied.
We now consider section 71(b)(1)(D). To qualify as alimony,
petitioner’s obligation must terminate at the death of Ms.
Warriner. In order to determine whether an obligation exists,
the terms of the applicable instrument must be considered, or if
the instrument is silent on the matter, we look to State law.
Kean v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-163, supplemented by T.C.
Memo. 2003-275.
Paragraphs 3a and 3b of the Amended Order provide for two
categories of payments to Ms. Warriner. First, paragraph 3a
provides that the “amount of $452.00 per month * * * continues
regardless of the future marital status of * * * [Ms. Warriner].”
The Amended Order does not address whether payments are to
continue after the death of Ms. Warriner.
Under Kean, we continue our analysis by looking to Colorado
law. In 1971, Colorado enacted the Uniform Dissolution of
Marriage Act (UDMA), Colo. Rev. Stat. secs. 14-10-101 through 14-
10-133 (2003). The UDMA provides that unless “otherwise agreed
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