Estate of Sarah E. Greve, deceased, Charles E. Greve & David R. Greve, Co-Executors - Page 14

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          satisfies section 7491(a)(2)(A) and (B) with respect to any                 
          factual issue relating to respondent’s deficiency determinations            
          that remains in this case.  On the record before us, we conclude            
          that the estate’s burden of proof on any such issue, see Rule               
          142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933), does not              
          shift to respondent under section 7491(a).                                  
               We turn first to the power of appointment that decedent had            
          with respect to one-sixth of the principal of the testamentary              
          trust.  For the first time on brief, the estate advances the                
          position that, pursuant to the testamentary trust, decedent had a           
          special power of appointment, and not a general power of appoint-           
          ment, with respect to that portion of the principal of that                 
          trust.8  The estate does not cite any Code section, Treasury                
          regulation, or caselaw in support of its position.9  Instead, the           

               8We conclude that the estate’s position on brief that dece-            
          dent had a special power of appointment, and not a general power            
          of appointment, with respect to one-sixth of the principal of the           
          testamentary trust raises a new issue.  However, respondent does            
          not object to, and we find no prejudice to respondent as a result           
          of, the estate’s raising that issue for the first time on brief.            
               9The estate acknowledges that if the Court were to find that           
          decedent had a general power of appointment with respect to one-            
          sixth of the principal of the testamentary trust, under Pennsyl-            
          vania law decedent exercised that power through the residuary               
          clause in her will.  In that event, the estate would concede that           
          the portion of that principal subject to that power is includible           
          in decedent’s gross estate under sec. 2041(a)(1). The estate’s              
          position with respect to Pennsylvania law, see sec. 20.2041-1(d),           
          Estate Tax Regs., accurately reflects that under Pennsylvania law           
          an individual who has a general power of appointment may exercise           
          that power through the residuary clause in that individual’s                
          will.  See 20 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. sec. 2514 (13) (West Supp.               
                                                             (continued...)           




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