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before this Court involving a redetermination of the fraud
penalties determined for 1992 and 1993.
Respondent counters that there was no ministerial delay in
connection with the October 1999 determination of the fraud
penalties for 1989 and 1990 because respondent was restricted
from examining petitioner’s 1989 and 1990 amended returns,
because of the criminal prosecution of petitioner covering those
years, until the March 3, 1999 memorandum of District Counsel
advising respondent’s Examination Division of the conclusion of
the criminal proceedings. Respondent further argues that, in any
event, respondent’s first contact in writing with petitioner
regarding the 1989 and 1990 fraud penalties was the October 4,
1999 notice of deficiency.
We find untenable petitioner’s argument that any delay
beyond August 1995 in issuing a notice of deficiency determining
the 1989 and 1990 fraud penalties constituted a delay or error in
the performance of a ministerial act.6 Petitioner contends that
all information had been provided to respondent, and all
consultations completed, with respect to the 1989 and 1990 fraud
6 Other than his bald claim that all interest should be
abated, petitioner offers no argument in support of the
proposition that an abatement back to the due dates of his 1989
and 1990 returns should occur. We accordingly consider only the
earliest claim for which petitioner offers any support; namely,
that interest should be abated starting in August 1995 because
respondent should have issued a notice of deficiency concerning
the 1989 and 1990 fraud penalties at that time.
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