Robert K. and Dawn E. Lowry - Page 5

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          dated December 15, 1993.  Petitioners believe that the December             
          15, 1993, date on these documents establishes that the                      
          forgiveness of indebtedness income was realized in 1993, not                
          1994.                                                                       
               However, petitioners have declined to address, or have                 
          misconstrued, the most salient fact; namely, that the escrow                
          instructions, dated December 9, 1993, were issued to the Title              
          Company on behalf of both AAL, the creditor, and the debtor                 
          Partnership.  The escrow instructions are worded in such a way              
          that the Title Company’s “acceptance” of the instructions would             
          be completed only when various exceptions to closing title had              
          been satisfied.  These, in fact, were not completed until May 27,           
          1994, when title closed with the filing for recordation of the              
          aforementioned Grant Deed and the issuance of an owner’s title              
          policy, the exceptions having been satisfied.  It was on this               
          date that 1994, and not 1993, was established as the year in                
          which the forgiveness of indebtedness income was realized.                  
               Petitioners dispute the Court’s holding that the facts do              
          not bring this case within those of Keith v. Commissioner, 115              
          T.C. 605 (2000), which case specifically involved a type of                 
          transaction under Georgia law known as a “contract for deed.”  As           
          we pointed out in the Memorandum Opinion, Georgia law normally              
          construes a contract for deed as a device for passing equitable             
          ownership, leaving the seller with bare legal title and                     






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