Jimie R. and Sandra Herlitschek Overby - Page 6

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               Bank deposits are prima facie evidence of income.  Clayton             
          v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 632, 645 (1994).  When the Commissioner           
          uses the bank deposits method of analysis to reconstruct a                  
          taxpayer’s income, this method assumes that all money deposited             
          in a taxpayer’s bank account during a given period constitutes              
          income to the taxpayer.  The Commissioner must take into account            
          any nontaxable source or deductible expense of which he has                 
          knowledge.  Id. at 645-646.  The taxpayer nonetheless has the               
          burden of showing that the determination is incorrect.2  Id. at             
          645.                                                                        
               Petitioners contend that unexplained bank deposits of                  
          $22,082.25 do not constitute income in that such amount was                 
          attributable to a cash hoard of lifetime earnings that they                 
          periodically “pulled from the ground and deposited * * * in the             
          bank.”  Petitioner testified that he did not particularly like or           
          trust banks, citing his parents’ experience “during the                     
          Depression days”, when “they lost money in the bank”.                       
          Petitioner further testified:  “I was a little leery of the IRS,            
          so when I was asked some questions about did you have money at              


               2  Sec. 7491, regarding the shifting of the burden of proof,           
          is generally effective for court proceedings arising in                     
          connection with examinations commencing after July 22, 1998, the            
          date of enactment of the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring             
          and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-206, sec. 3001(a), 112 Stat.            
          726.  The examination of petitioners’ 1995 return commenced in              
          1997.  Accordingly, sec. 7491 does not apply in the present case.           






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