- 8 - Commissioner, 111 T.C. 250, 255 (1998); Schoof v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 1, 11 (1998); Clark v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. 215, 224- 225 (1993); Swihart v. Commisioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-407; Pulliam v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-354; Roundy v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1995-298, affd. 122 F.3d 835 (9th Cir. 1997). The explicit and detailed inclusion of specific exceptions as part of the statutory scheme itself suggests that other liberties should not be indiscriminately inserted through the judicial process. Cf. Larotonda v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 287 (1987) (interpreting former section 72(m)(5), a penalty provision without the list now contained in section 72(t)(2), and largely limited to its facts by our subsequent holding in Aronson v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 283 (1992)). This impression is further buttressed by legislative history. The 10-percent additional tax provision designated section 72(t) was enacted as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-514, sec. 1123, 100 Stat. 2472. Committee reports accompanying the statute’s passage reflect that the exceptions given were a deliberate and considered part of the development of section 72(t). See H. Rept. 99-426, at 727-731 (1985), 1986-3 C.B. (Vol. 2) 1, 727-731; S. Rept. 99-313, at 611-617 (1986), 1986-3 C.B. (Vol. 3) 1, 611-617; H. Conf. Rept. 99-841, at II-452 to II-458 (1986), 1986-3 C.B. (Vol. 4) 1, 452-458. Also, any over-broadening of the grounds for exception could thwart thePage: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Next
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