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consideration for the donation, as well as an estimate of their
fair market value. Sec. 170(f)(8)(B); sec. 1.170A-13(f)(2), (6),
Income Tax Regs. According to the Commissioner, the letters NCF
sent Roark fail to meet the terms of the statute and regulation
because Roark did expect that NCF would pay the premiums, and the
payment of those premiums was valuable to him--in other words, it
was not true, as NCF wrote in its letter, that “no goods or
services have been provided in connection with this gift.”
In countering the Commissioner, Roark first argues that NCF
was not legally obliged to pay the premiums. Whether NCF was
under a legal obligation might be relevant here under the step-
transaction doctrine. (Though perhaps not even then. See Blake
v. Commissioner, 697 F.2d 473, 480 (2d Cir. 1982), affg. T.C.
Memo. 1981-579.) The regulation that applies here, however,
makes clear that the key question is whether a donor expected to
receive consideration, not whether he was entitled to receive it:
“A donee organization provides goods or services in consideration
for a taxpayer’s payment if, at the time the taxpayer makes the
payment to the donee organization, the taxpayer receives or
expects to receive goods or services in exchange for that
payment. Sec. 1.170A-13(f)(6), Income Tax Regs. (emphasis
added). We look for a quid pro quo, not a possible cause of
action.
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