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omission given petitioner’s failure to show that such information
is customary in a MFTRA-X transcript as compared to a TXMODA
transcript. Therefore, we find that Appeals Officer Mazaroli’s
determination that the 1991 extension covering 1982 was timely
executed with respect to the 1983 assessment is supported by a
preponderance of the evidence.6
6 We note, in passing, that the Internal Revenue Service
Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 (RRA 1998), Pub. L. 105-206,
sec. 3461, 112 Stat. 764 enacted a new sec. 6502(a)(2) to provide
that extensions of the 10-year statute of limitations on
collection may only be made in connection with the simultaneous
execution of an installment agreement. That rule is effective
for extension requests made after Dec. 31, 1999. RRA 1998 sec.
3461(c)(1). RRA 1998 sec. 3461(c)(2) provides that pre-2000
extensions (not made in conformity with the new requirement)
shall expire on the latest of (1) the last day of the 10-year
collection period provided in sec. 6502(a)(1), (2) Dec. 31, 2002,
or (3) in the case of an extension executed in connection with an
installment agreement, the 90th day after the expiration of such
extension. Assuming arguendo that the 1991 extensions are not
covered by the last of the three alternative expiration dates for
pre-2000 extensions (because they were executed too long, more
than 9 months, before the July 13, 1992, installment agreement),
and even though the statutory 10-year limitations period on
collection with respect to all of the assessments for the years
in issue has expired and we are beyond Dec. 31, 2002, the
transition rule for pre-2000 extensions does not prevent
collection herein. That is because respondent commenced
collection by issuing the notice of levy on July 3, 2001, well
before the Dec. 31, 2002, alternative expiration date for pre-
2000 extensions. Petitioner’s filing of a request for a
Collection Due Process hearing on July 10, 2001, suspended the
running of the period that otherwise would have ended on Dec. 31,
2002, pursuant to sec. 6330(e)(1), which provides, in relevant
part, that “the running of any period of limitations under
section 6502 * * * shall be suspended for the period during which
* * * [the] hearing, and appeals therein, are pending.” That
suspension is still in effect.
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