- 13 -
“[T]he existence of actual intent is a question of fact”. United
States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288, 1304 (3d Cir.
1986).
Respondent concedes that Self Oil’s asset transfer did not
hinder, delay, or defraud his assessment and collection of income
tax liabilities. As respondent aptly explains, the income tax
liability at issue is attributable to the sale of Self Oil’s
assets; the income tax liability could not have existed at the
time of the transfer. Indeed, respondent contends that Self
Oil’s desire to frustrate the collection of other creditors,
namely, the States of Ohio and Pennsylvania, is a sufficient
justification to deem the transfer fraudulent under PUFTA. We
agree. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has recently
stated: “PUFTA does not require proof to set aside a transfer
that the debtor intended to defraud the specific creditor
bringing the fraudulent transfer claim. PUFTA deems a transfer
fraudulent if the debtor had the ‘actual intent to hinder, delay
or defraud any creditor’”. 718 Arch St. Associates v. Blatstein,
192 F.3d 88, 97 (3d Cir. 1999); see Walsh v. Gutshall (In re
Walter), 261 Bankr. 139, 142-143 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2001) (“It is
not necessary that debtor have intended to hinder all of his
creditors for � 5104(a)(1) to apply; it is sufficient that he
intended to hinder, delay or defraud ‘any creditor’.”).
Page: Previous 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 NextLast modified: May 25, 2011