-23- personal property is its retail sales price. By extension of this presumption, the fair market value of an item of tangible personal property not sold at auction could be presumed to be no greater than its high bid at auction. We do not believe that the presumption of Rev. Proc. 65-19, supra, applies to set conclusively the fair market value of the six assets in question. Five of those assets are items of jewelry. We find pursuant to Carmona’s testimony that the public does not frequently purchase jewelry at auction. As to the sixth item, a loose 18.2-ct. sapphire, we are unable to find in the record that loose sapphires are typically sold to the public at auction. However, even if the presumption were to apply to one or more of these six assets, we conclude from the record that the high bids for those six assets are not reflective of their retail sales price. We bear in mind especially our findings herein as to the much higher prices which the decedent paid to Mamiye and Lloyds for the comparable and other items shown on the receipts. We recognize that respondent stipulated that the applicable values of 19 of the 25 seized assets were the same as their auction prices and that those prices were in most instances lower than Carmona’s appraised values. In valuing the assets in dispute, we do not find in the record that respondent has presumed under Rev. Proc. 65-19, 1965-2 C.B. 1002, that the fair market values of the 19 assets equaled their auction prices. InPage: Previous 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 Next
Last modified: May 25, 2011