Vision Information Services, L.L.C., Irene Correia, Tax Matters Partner - Page 9

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          and that Vision would be receiving the $3 million and $1.75                 
          million payments in dispute as a “License Fee”.  This agreement             
          also labeled the transaction underlying the payments a “Grant of            
          License” and referenced the license agreement as an integral part           
          of the Vision agreement by stating that “The continuing existence           
          and validity of Vision’s license of the Nordic Software from                
          Nordic * * * shall be of the essence of the Vision agreement” and           
          that “The Vision Software License shall have a term coextensive             
          with the Term of the Vision agreement”.                                     
               We conclude that the transaction was a licensing agreement             
          and, hence, that the disputed payments are taxable as ordinary              
          income.1  We have considered all arguments made by the parties as           
          to this conclusion and have found those arguments not discussed             
          herein to be irrelevant and/or without merit.  We have not                  
          considered the alternative arguments which respondent made in the           
          event that we were to conclude that the subject transaction was             
          not a licensing agreement.  To reflect concessions,                         

                                                  Decision will be entered            
                                             under Rule 155.                          


               1 We also believe that the reimbursement provision of the              
          Vision agreement is more consistent with our finding of a                   
          licensing agreement as opposed to a sale.  Whereas petitioner               
          asserts that the useful life of the subject property was less               
          than 4 years, we find that the parties to the Vision agreement              
          believed at the time of that agreement that the property’s useful           
          life was 5 years or more.                                                   




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