-16-
Petitioner nevertheless argues that the bank made the
settlement payment as a result of the alleged loss of his license
and that such loss is a personal physical injury under section
104(a)(2) so that the settlement proceeds are excludable in their
entirety. This argument, however, is unsupported by the record
in this case for several reasons. First, the agreement makes no
specific allocation of proceeds to the alleged loss of the
license. Second, although petitioner’s complaint alleges that
petitioner was falsely labeled a participant in a RICO scheme,
the complaint does not allege petitioner lost his license as a
result. Third, in March 1998, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit found that petitioner had not proved that he had been
deprived of his license by the defendants, making it highly
unlikely that the bank would offer petitioner $500,000 for the
alleged loss of the license more than a year later.
Even if we assumed, for purposes of argument, that the bank
made the settlement payment on account of the alleged loss of
petitioner’s license, this fact would not support petitioner’s
argument. Petitioner’s interest in his license is a property
interest, and recovery for “business or property” is separate and
distinct from recovery for personal injury. Berg v. First State
Ins. Co., 915 F.2d 460, 464 (9th Cir. 1990); Mishler v. Nev.
State Bd. of Med. Examrs., 896 F.2d 408, 409-410 (9th Cir. 1990);
Rylewicz v. Beaton Servs., Ltd., 888 F.2d 1175, 1180 (7th Cir.
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