- 8 - regulations are vague, they do not allow a post-event “ballpark guesstimate”. Fowler v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-223. In testimony and exhibits, petitioner wife produced credible evidence to establish that she met the requisite time requirements. Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 442 (2001). Petitioner wife did not comply, however, with respondent’s reasonable request to view redacted law practice time sheets. Accordingly, we find that section 7491 does not shift the burden of proof to respondent. Petitioners therefore bear the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that they qualified for an exception to the definition of a rental activity. Extraordinary Personal Services We address next whether petitioners qualify for the extraordinary personal services exception. To qualify for the extraordinary personal services exception, petitioners must prove that the activity was not a “rental activity” under section 469(j)(8). In so doing, petitioners must prove that the use by customers of AGI’s real property was incidental to their receipt of AGI’s services.6 Sec. 1.469-1T(e)(3)(ii)(C), Temporary Income Tax Regs., supra at 5702. Very little guidance exists on the meaning of “extraordinary” personal services, and no reported case by this 6The extraordinary personal services exception is separate from another exception, not at issue here, where the rental of property is “incidental to” a nonrental activity. See sec. 1.469-1T(e)(3)(ii)(D), Temporary Income Tax Regs., 53 Fed. Reg. 5702 (Feb. 25, 1998). Unlike the extraordinary personal services exception, this exception involves a computational analysis. See sec. 1.469-1T(e)(3)(vi); compare sec. 1.469-1T(e)(3)(v), Temporary Income Tax Regs., supra.Page: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 Next
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