Sheila D. Clinkscale & Jantz S. Clinkscale - Page 9

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          in Mr. Clinkscale’s supplemental response to respondent’s motion            
          that “If the respondent is merely stating that they are owed                
          something, then I concede.”7                                                
               On the instant record, we find that respondent has estab-              
          lished by clear and convincing evidence that there was an under-            
          payment of Mr. Clinkscale’s tax for each of the taxable years               
          1994, 1995, and 1996.                                                       
               In order to prove fraudulent intent, the Commissioner must             
          prove by clear and convincing evidence that the taxpayer intended           
          to evade tax, which the taxpayer believed to be owing, by conduct           
          intended to conceal, mislead, or otherwise prevent the collection           
          of such tax.  Laurins v. Commissioner, 889 F.2d 910, 913 (9th               
          Cir. 1989), affg. Norman v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1987-265;              
          Parks v. Commissioner, supra at 661.  The existence of fraud is a           
          question of fact to be resolved upon consideration of the entire            
          record.  DiLeo v. Commissioner, supra at 874; Gajewski v. Commis-           
          sioner, 67 T.C. 181, 199 (1976), affd. without published opinion            
          578 F.2d 1383 (8th Cir. 1978).  Fraud is never presumed or                  
          imputed and should not be found in circumstances which create at            
          most only a suspicion.  Toussaint v. Commissioner, 743 F.2d 309,            


               6(...continued)                                                        
          those years.                                                                
               7In petitioner’s supplemental response to respondent’s                 
          motion, Mr. Clinkscale further stated:  “But there is no specific           
          amount mentioned, to my knowledge, so therefore I cannot agree to           
          a dollar amount.”                                                           




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