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assertions therein. However, unsupported statements in a brief
and exhibits that have not been properly admitted into evidence
at trial do not constitute competent evidence. Rule 143(b);
Niedringhaus v. Commissioner, 99 T.C. 202, 214 n.7 (1992);
Viehweg v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 1248, 1255 (1988); Castro v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-115. Petitioners also complain in
their brief that Becky was “not permitted to speak”. The Court
did not permit Becky to speak on behalf of petitioners at
calendar call, as she had not entered an appearance on their
behalf and was not herself a party.6 However, petitioners were
free to call Becky as a witness at the trial but failed to do so.
The absence of her testimony is accordingly a circumstance of
their own making.
II. Burden of Proof
Petitioners contend that, pursuant to section 7491(a), the
burden of proof has shifted to respondent with respect to all
outstanding issues.
Generally, the burden of proof is on the taxpayer to show
that the Commissioner’s determinations are erroneous. See Rule
142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933). However,
subject to certain limitations, section 7491(a) shifts the burden
of proof to the Commissioner with respect to any factual issue
6 Becky’s status as a party had been specifically addressed
before trial as a result of respondent’s motion to dismiss her as
a party for lack of jurisdiction, which was granted.
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