John R. Forrest - Page 8

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          More specifically, petitioner contends that the 16th Amendment              
          authorizing a direct tax on income is itself unconstitutional               
          because it violates the 10th Amendment.  Even if petitioner's               
          argument contained a scintilla of merit (which it does not), it             
          would be unavailing in this proceeding because petitioner is                
          precluded at this point from disputing the underlying tax                   
          liabilities.  Sec. 6330(c)(2)(B).                                           
               The foregoing being petitioner's only argument, and there              
          being no genuine issue as to any material fact, see Rule 121(a)             
          and (b), we conclude that respondent is entitled to summary                 
          judgment in his favor on the issue of whether he may proceed with           
          the proposed levy.                                                          
               In his motion, respondent also seeks imposition on                     
          petitioner of a penalty under section 6673(a)(1).  We have                  
          previously warned taxpayers that penalties under section 6673 may           
          be imposed in lien and levy actions where frivolous or groundless           
          positions are taken.  See, e.g., Roberts v. Commissioner, 118               

               2(...continued)                                                        
          the notice requirements of sec. 6303(a).  Hughes v. United                  
          States, 953 F.2d 531, 536 (9th Cir. 1992); Standifird v.                    
          Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-245, affd. 72 Fed. Appx. 729 (9th             
          Cir. 2003).                                                                 
               Finally, petitioner argued, for the first time at the                  
          hearing on respondent's motion, that sec. 6330 did not apply to             
          this case because the statute was enacted after the deficiencies            
          for 1991-94 had been determined and assessed.  Even if petitioner           
          were permitted to raise the issue at this point, it is devoid of            
          merit.  Sec. 6330 applies to collection actions commenced 180               
          days after its July 22, 1998, enactment, or Jan. 18, 1999.  The             
          collection action in this case commenced on May 27, 2002.                   





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