Francenia M. Griffin - Page 18

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               party’s omission of taxable income or claim of erroneous               
               deductions...                                                          
          Respondent contends that the fact that petitioner has a legal               
          obligation under the divorce decree to pay the unpaid tax                   
          liabilities weighs against granting relief to petitioner.  Rev.             
          Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.03(2)(a)(iv), indicates that if Mr. Griffin           
          had a legal obligation under the divorce decree to pay the tax              
          liabilities, then that fact would weigh in favor of granting                
          relief to petitioner.  Likewise, if the divorce decree had placed           
          the obligation to pay the taxes on petitioner, then that fact               
          would weigh against granting relief to petitioner as indicated in           
          Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.03(2)(a)(iv).  In the present case,              
          the divorce decree established that each party was liable for 50            
          percent of the liabilities.  Therefore, this is a neutral factor.           
          However, the fact that the divorce decree established that each             
          party was liable for 50 percent of the liabilities does indicate            
          that petitioner had a reasonable belief that such liabilities               
          would not be paid in full by Mr. Griffin.                                   
          4.  Significant Benefit                                                     
               The examiner determined that petitioner did not                        
          significantly benefit from the underpayments and thus found that            
          this factor favored granting relief to petitioner.  However, at             
          trial, respondent argued that petitioner’s obtaining an                     
          associate’s degree was a significant benefit.  During the period            
          from 1992 to 1998, petitioner did obtain an associate’s degree.             





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