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Cir. 1955), affg. a Memorandum Opinion of this Court; Weiss v.
Commissioner, 221 F.2d 152, 156 (8th Cir. 1955), affg. T.C. Memo.
1954-51; Schroeder v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1986-467. This is
so even when the testimony is uncontroverted if it is improbable,
unreasonable, or questionable. Archer v. Commissioner, supra;
Weiss v. Commissioner, supra; see Quock Ting v. United States,
140 U.S. 417 (1891). We found petitioner’s testimony to be
conclusory and/or questionable in certain material respects.
Under the circumstances presented here, we are not required to,
and generally do not, rely on petitioner’s testimony. See Lerch
v. Commissioner, 877 F.2d 624, 631-632 (7th Cir. 1989), affg.
T.C. Memo. 1987-295; Geiger v. Commissioner, 440 F.2d 688, 689-
690 (9th Cir. 1971), affg. per curiam T.C. Memo. 1969-159;
Tokarski v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 74, 77 (1986).
We further note that petitioner did not call the “alleged
experts” he allegedly relied upon as witnesses. We infer that
their testimony would not have been favorable to petitioner or
that no such experts exist. Wichita Terminal Elevator Co. v.
Commissioner, 6 T.C. 1158, 1165 (1946), affd. 162 F.2d 513 (10th
Cir. 1947).
As noted supra, petitioner advanced shopworn arguments
characteristic of tax-protester rhetoric that has been
universally rejected by this and other courts regarding why the
wages, interest, and dividends are not income. Whatever “advice”
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