Juanita and Emmanuel Kendricks - Page 3

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          dispute the underlying tax liabilities for those years; (2)                 
          Appeals abused its discretion in determining that collection by             
          levy was the most appropriate course of action when petitioners             
          wished to submit collection alternatives and an offer in                    
          compromise was pending; and (3) Appeals would not, in connection            
          with petitioners’ claims, consider the claims of two nominee                
          corporations (nominees of Mrs. Kendricks), Foxy Investments,                
          Inc., and J & K Trucking Co., Inc. (the nominee corporations).              
          By order dated March 17, 2004, we, in effect, disposed of                   
          petitioners’ third ground, by granting respondent’s motion to               
          dismiss for lack of jurisdiction (and to obtain certain other               
          relief) with respect to the nominee corporations.3  With respect            
          to petitioners’ remaining two grounds, respondent moves for                 
          summary judgment in his favor (the motion).  Petitioners object.            
               Rule 121 provides for summary judgment.  Summary judgment              
          may be granted with respect to all or any part of the legal                 
          issues in controversy "if the pleadings, answers to                         
          interrogatories, depositions, admissions, and any other                     
          acceptable materials, together with the affidavits, if any, show            
          that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that a           
          decision may be rendered as a matter of law."  Rule 121(a) and              
          (b).  When a motion for summary judgment is made and properly               

               3  We based our order on our finding that the nominee                  
          corporations were not persons liable to pay the unpaid                      
          assessments and, therefore, were not proper parties to this case.           

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