William J. McCorkle - Page 18

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          in the $2 million remittance.6                                              
               We need not decide whether respondent had standing to make a           
          claim pursuant to 21 U.S.C. sec. 853(c), (n)(6)(B).  Neither need           
          we decide whether a person receiving a payment in discharge of a            
          liability qualifies as a “purchaser” within the meaning of 21               
          U.S.C. sec. 853(c), (n)(6)(B).7  We need not decide those                   
          questions because, even if we were to answer both questions in              
          the affirmative, petitioner cannot show that respondent was                 


               6  Respondent claims that, in order for a tax debt to arise            
          to permit him to have any rights against the taxpayer and the               
          taxpayer’s property, he must first make an assessment of the tax            
          and then make a demand for payment.  In support of that claim,              
          respondent points to secs. 6201 through 6203, 6321, 6322; secs.             
          301.6201-1 and 301.6203-1, Proced. & Admin. Regs.; and Capuano v.           
          United States, 955 F.2d 1427, 1432 (11th Cir. 1992).  Here,                 
          respondent states, assessment and demand followed by more than a            
          year his compliance with the forfeiture order.  Petitioner’s                
          position is that, pursuant to sec. 6151, his tax debt for 1996              
          arose on Apr. 15, 1997, when payment thereof was due.                       
               7  It is not settled whether, in using the term “bona fide             
          purchaser for value” in 21 U.S.C. secs. 853(c) and (n)(6)(B)                
          (emphasis added), Congress intended the term “purchaser” to                 
          operate as a limitation on the class of persons that, having                
          engaged in arm’s-length transactions with the defendant, is                 
          entitled to protection of its interests.  The Court of Appeals              
          for the Fourth Circuit has determined that Congress did not                 
          intend such a limitation.  United States v. Reckmeyer, 836 F.2d             
          200, 208 (4th Cir. 1987) (“If the term ‘purchaser’ were so                  
          construed, a car dealer who sold a car to a later convicted                 
          defendant without knowledge of the potential forfeitability of              
          the defendant's assets could have the payment he received for the           
          car forfeited while a person who purchased otherwise forfeitable            
          stock from the defendant would be protected.”). Other Courts of             
          Appeals have not interpreted 21 U.S.C. sec. 853(c)(6)(B) so                 
          liberally.  See, e.g., United States v. BCCI Holdings                       
          (Luxembourg), S.A., 46 F.3d 1185, 1191-1192 (D.C. Cir. 1995).  We           
          shall await an appropriate opportunity to address the issue.                





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