-10-
2004, letter, however, is an implicit, if not overt,
acknowledgment of petitioner’s receipt of the disputed letter,
belying its contention to the contrary.
Our finding presuming delivery of the disputed letter is
based on an extension of the knowledge principle, which underlies
rule 901(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Evidence and the related
so-called reply letter doctrine, to this circumstance. See
generally John W. Strong et al., McCormick on Evidence, sec. 225
(5th ed. 1999). Rule 901(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Evidence
provides for the authentication of a written document if its
substance, content, or other distinctive characteristics,
analyzed in conjunction with other circumstantial evidence, is
indicative of authorship. One application of such general method
of authentication is the reply letter doctrine, which was relied
on in Winel v. United States, 365 F.2d 646, 648 (8th Cir. 1966),
in holding: “It has long been recognized that one of the
principal situations where the authenticity of a letter is
provable by circumstantial evidence * * * is where it can be
shown that the letter was sent in reply to a previous
communication. * * * In the instant case the inherent nature of
the communication makes it absolutely certain that it is a reply
communication.” See also United States v. Henry, 164 F.3d 1304,
1309 (10th Cir. 1999); Purer & Co. v. Aktiebolaget Addo, 410 F.2d
871, 875 (9th Cir. 1969).
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