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reflecting an increase of value above the cost of any underlying
asset. Id. at 1184; see also Watkins v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
2004-244 (taxpayer’s right to receive future annual lottery
payments did not constitute a capital asset); Clopton v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-95; Boehme v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2003-81. Petitioner’s arguments fail to distinguish her
situation from that of the taxpayer in Maginnis.
Additionally, the governing facts in the instant case are
indistinguishable from the facts in Davis v. Commissioner, 119
T.C. 1 (2002), and other cases, in which a taxpayer assigned a
right to future lottery installment payments in return for a
lump-sum payout at a discounted value from a third party. We
held in each of these cases that a right to future lottery
installment payments did not constitute a capital asset within
the meaning of section 1221. See Wolman v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2004-262; Watkins v. Commissioner, supra; Lattera v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-216; Clopton v. Commissioner,
supra; Simpson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-155; Johns v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-140; Boehme v. Commissioner, supra.
It is unnecessary to repeat the thorough analysis set forth in
Davis v. Commissioner, supra. Petitioner has not attempted to
distinguish Davis and the other cases, instead arguing analogies
to cases in different contexts. We see no reason to depart from
the consistent treatment of identical issues. We hold that the
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